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DARFUR: A VERY INCONVENIENT 
DEVELOPMENT 
Eric Reeves  
Professor of English and Literature, Smith College 
¶1 In March of 2004, at the very height of the most violent phase of the Darfur 
genocide, Mukesh Kapila approached the end of his yearlong tenure as UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator for Sudan, and used the occasion to make a series of extraordinary and 
institutionally unconstrained comments: 
¶2 “The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved. 
[The slaughter in Darfur] is more than just a conflict, it is an organised attempt to do 
away with a group of people. I was present in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, and 
I've seen many other situations around the world, and I am totally shocked at what is 
going on in Darfur.” 
¶3 Despite transparently mendacious claims by the National Islamic Front regime in 
Khartoum in early February 2004 that it had brought the situation in Darfur under “total 
military control,” Kapila insisted, for all who would listen:  
¶4 “The pattern of organised attacks on civilians and villages, abductions, killings and 
organised rapes by militias is getting worse by the day and could deteriorate even further. 
'One can see how the situation might develop without prompt [action]...all the warning 
signs are there.’” 
¶5 Of course there has been no “prompt action,” and Kapila’s ominous premonition 
about “might develop” has come fully to pass. 
¶6 What is less widely known than these frequently cited remarks is that behind the 
scenes, Kapila had been carrying the same message to senior UN and UK officials for 
months.  He went public with his assessment because he no longer had to fear for his job, 
and because despite his urgent warnings, the UN was not responding. But we know from 
Kapila’s testimony before a British Parliamentary committee, and comments cited earlier 
this month in the Times of London, what he had been saying for months prior to March 
2004—and how his warnings were received: 
¶7 “There was a fundamental feeling among very senior people that Darfur was a very 
inconvenient development and they would rather not know about it.” 
¶8 What we are seeing today in Darfur is too much a product of this feeling that 
genocide in a remote, arid, impoverished, and geopolitically inconsequential region of 
Africa was simply “inconvenient.”  Rather than confront the difficult challenges in 
halting vast, ethnically-targeted human destruction, all international actors of 
consequence settled for political and diplomatic half-measures, or merely symbolic 
measures—and too often allowed, for convenience’s sake, the crisis to be defined as 
essentially humanitarian in nature, with an overlay of unfortunate tribal conflicts 
animated by competition for diminishing natural resources.  This gross misrepresentation 
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of the catastrophe still finds an audience in many quarters, as the desire to ignore the 
urgency of Darfur’s crisis overwhelms the need to look honestly at what is happening. 
¶9 But let us for the moment ignore the disingenuous chattering that seems a specialty 
of the British left and ask seriously about the consequences of continued inaction on 
Darfur.  There is no better point of departure than Jan Egeland’s concluding remarks in 
his August 28th briefing of the UN Security Council: 
¶10 “In the past months I have repeatedly called for attention to the deteriorating 
situation in Darfur. As you have heard today our warnings have become a black reality 
[calling] for immediate action: insecurity is at its highest levels since 2004; access at its 
lowest levels since that date; and we may well be on the brink of a return to all-out war. 
This would mean the withdrawal of international staff from Darfur, leaving millions of 
vulnerable Darfuris to suffer their fate without assistance and with few outsiders to 
witness. 
¶11 [The humanitarian gains of the past two years in Darfur] can all be lost within 
weeks---not months. I cannot give a starker warning than to say that we are at a point 
where even hope may escape us and the lives of hundreds of thousands could be 
needlessly lost.” 
¶12 Six weeks later, there is still no significant “action” of the sort the UN 
Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs called for.  Passage of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1706 (August 31st), under Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter, 
has meant nothing, despite the robust force outlined: 22,500 troops and security 
personnel, with a clear mandate for civilian and humanitarian protection.  Notably, 
Resolution 1706 also provides for monitoring of Sudan’s borders with Chad and the 
Central African Republic—neighboring countries into which Darfur’s genocidal 
destruction has already bled in ghastly and highly destabilizing fashion, with most of the 
responsibility clearly falling to the Khartoum regime.  I would call your particular 
attention to the reportage from the Central African Republic by Nicholas Kristof of the 
New York Times earlier this month.  
¶13 There is an irreducible truth in the present historic moment, however inconvenient 
it remains: the UN force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1706 could save 
hundreds of thousands of innocent lives if rapidly deployed with adequate resources for 
military and security personnel. This force has been blocked by the same handful of 
National Islamic Front genocidaires in Khartoum that have for three and a half years 
relentlessly, systematically, and savagely targeted the non-Arab or African tribal 
populations of Darfur as a means of crushing the insurgency that emerged in February 
2003. The ethnically- targeted nature of this well-orchestrated destruction has been 
extensively documented in numerous human rights reports, UN assessment missions, and 
by a wide range of journalists and humanitarian workers. 
¶14 To be sure, the nature of conflict and genocidal destruction in Darfur has changed 
significantly since the extraordinary levels of violence in 2003-2004, which saw 80-90% 
of all African villages in Darfur destroyed (this is the consensus range among my many 
contacts in the Darfuri diaspora).  But what must not be forgotten is how 
comprehensively destructive village assaults typically were, including the demolishing or 
poisoning of precious water wells and irrigation systems ; destroying food- and seed-
stocks, as well as agricultural implements and water vessels; cutting down mature fruit 
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trees; and the looting or killing of livestock, often representing generations of family 
wealth. 
¶15 Such deliberately destructive violence, along with mass executions, the systematic 
and racialized use of rape as a weapon of war, torture, abduction, and other forms of 
violent abuse have produced the staggering numbers of deaths, displaced persons, and 
civilians who are now critically in need of humanitarian aid.   It may be that people die 
now not so much from violent attacks—though these are again accelerating very 
dramatically—as from the disease and malnutrition and despair that have come in their 
ghastly wake. But the 1948 Genocide Convention makes clear that these deaths are no 
less genocidal in nature: the deliberate, ethnically- targeted destruction of livelihoods and 
the ability to live is also genocide.  
¶16 What are the present obstacles to deployment of an appropriate international force 
to protect Darfuri civilians?  Why is it that the emerging legal norm of a “responsibility to 
protect” precisely such radically endangered populations has been so abjectly abandoned, 
despite its prominent place in the UN World Summit “outcome document” of September 
2005, specifically paragraph 139?   How can it be so inconsequential for Darfur that in 
April 2006 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674?  This 
resolution exp licitly “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World 
Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” 
¶17 Answers to these questions tell us much about how the history of the Darfur 
genocide will be written in the coming years—a history that will lack for neither detail, 
nor precise chronology, nor the clearest possible evidence of individual, institutional, and 
governmental responsibility.  Certainly there has never in the history of genocide been 
such a fully documented episode of sustained, systematic, deliberate destruction of 
human beings on an ethnic basis—and this will inevitably be the most salient fact in the 
history that must be written. 
¶18 The first and most essential part of any answer lies in the nature of the brutal 
security cabal that rules in Khartoum, and continues to be accepted as a legitimate 
government—indeed is dutifully referred to by the UN and other international actors as 
Sudan’s “Government of National Unity.”  But the National Islamic Front, which has 
innocuously and expediently renamed itself the National Congress Party, completely 
dominates the merely notional “Government of National Unity” and represents neither 
the people of southern Sudan, nor the people of Darfur, nor indeed any of Sudan’s 
marginalized populations.  The most senior political figures of the southern Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement(SPLM)—essentially the Government of South Sudan—
have repeatedly and explicitly called for deployment of the UN force.  So too have all 
factions of the badly divided Sudan Liberation Movement, including Minni Minawi, who 
signed the ill-conceived and ill- fated “Darfur Peace Agreement” negotiated in Abuja, 
Nigeria last spring.  Minawi is nominally the fourth-ranking member of the Presidency in 
the “Government of National Unity,” and SPLM’s Salva Kiir is First Vice-President—
both are completely irrelevant. 
¶19 Largely ignored in current deferential negotiations with the National Islamic Front, 
most prominently with President Omar al-Bashir, is the history of this ruthlessly 
survivalist regime, which came to power by military coup in June of 1989, deposing an 
elected government, and deliberately aborting Sudan’s most promising chance to 
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negotiate a north/south peace since independence in 1956.  In its 17 years in power, the 
National Islamic Front has repeatedly had recourse to genocidal destruction as a domestic 
security policy.  As seasoned Sudan observer Alex de Waal has written of the actions of 
this regime in Darfur: 
¶20 “This is not the genocidal campaign of a government at the height of its ideological 
hubris, as the 1992 jihad against the Nuba Mountains was, or coldly determined to secure 
natural resources, as when it sought to clear the oilfields of southern Sudan of their 
troublesome inhabitants. This is the routine cruelty of a security cabal, its humanity 
withered by years in power: it is genocide by force of habit.”  
¶21 [De Waal and Julie Flint have given us what is certainly our best account of the 
origins of the Darfur conflict: Darfur: A Short History of a Long War.] 
¶22 How is it that the international community has conferred upon these long-term 
genocidaires the right to veto UN deployment of a force to curtail ongoing genocidal 
destruction?  How is it that Jan Pronk, the Secretary General’s special representative for 
Sudan, two weeks ago simply capitulated to Khartoum’s obdurate refusal to countenance 
the UN force authorized by the Security Council?  On what basis—other than craven 
political expediency—did Pronk accept that the present African Union mission in Darfur 
would continue as the only source of security for over 4 million civilians in a 
humanitarian theater now much larger than France (if we include eastern Chad)—a 
population increasingly dependent upon humanitarian operations that are rapidly 
collapsing?   
¶23 A month ago Jan Egeland described these operations as in “free fall.”  In the 
intervening weeks I’ve received numerous, increasingly desperate communications from 
humanitarian workers in the field—extraordinarily courageous people who feel as 
abandoned as the civilians of Darfur, and only marginally less endangered. Huge areas of 
Darfur are either totally inaccessible or only tenuously accessible; and the areas of 
inaccessibility grow steadily greater as Khartoum’s current military offensive in North 
and West Darfur expands, with ongoing indiscriminate aerial bombardment of villages 
and civilian targets.   
¶24 Who is most responsible for current international inaction?  Russia and China have 
done most to insulate Khartoum from greater pressure by the Security Council; but the 
US and Europe have failed to convince these two veto-wielding members that Darfur 
matters enough—have failed to expend the necessary diplomatic and political capital to 
make Darfur a truly first-tier international issue.  The Arab League has gone through the 
motions of encouraging Khartoum to accept a UN force, but has made clear that it will 
not support UN deployment unless Khartoum consents.  And the African Union, which 
months ago made clear its inability to continue in Darfur, has also declared that, despite 
its radical shortcomings, it will not support UN deployment without Khartoum’s consent.  
A complete lack of political and moral courage on the part of Kofi Annan largely 
completes the picture of international impotence. 
¶25 Such impotence is all the reassurance the regime has needed to remain intransigent. 
¶26 Egeland’s grim prediction of hundreds of thousands of Darfuri civilians dying 
needlessly is even now being realized.  Given the present level of mortality—I believe, 
on the basis of all extant evidence, approximately half a million human beings—the 
overall death toll could exceed 1 million following the “hunger gap” of next summer.  It 
is impossible for me to believe that fewer than 10,000 people are dying every month, 
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given the reports I am receiving from the ground and humanitarian officials speaking 
confidentially. 
¶27 While the political reality is clear—the UN has no political will to make “the 
responsibility to protect” a reality in Darfur—so too is the moral reality: we have seen, on 
the basis of evidence that incinerates any possible agnosticism, genocide proceed for 
three and a half years and have refused to do what is necessary to halt the ultimate human 
crime.  This is the world as we find it. 
